

UCLA School of Public Affairs  
Department of Public Policy

**Crisis Decision Making in U.S. Foreign Policy**  
Undergraduate Course: Public Policy CM117, Poli Sci M121B

Spring 2006  
Thursdays 2:00-4:50 p.m.  
Room: Public Policy 3343C  
Office Hours: Thursdays 10am-noon

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Course Overview:

This seminar is designed to give graduate students and advanced undergraduates an in-depth look at the American foreign policy making process. In the first part of the course, students will examine competing explanations of international relations, analyzing whether, when, and how individuals, ideas and institutions play a role in resolving international issues. We will also focus more specifically on the U.S. foreign policy-making process, examining the institutional relationships between the president, the White House staff, the Cabinet, the Congress, and the American public. The second part of the course turns to 4 crises in U.S. history. In each crisis, students will be asked to assume the role of an actual policymaker— the Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other relevant senior policy adviser — and to discuss policy alternatives from that role’s point of view. (Roles will rotate so that each student will assume each role at least once). Students will also be asked to write memos to the President analyzing these crises from their role’s perspective. The aim of the course is to develop students’ analytical and writing skills, to expose students to some of the major substantive debates in U.S. foreign policy, and to give students a more hands-on feel for the constraints and challenges of crisis decision-making.

Grading Basis

- Graduate student assignments will be read separately from undergraduate work and will be expected to demonstrate a more sophisticated understanding of the theoretical and case materials.
- Crisis analysis memos to the President: 30%
- Take-home midterm exam: 20%
- Class participation (including weekly foreign policy quizzes): 25%
- Crisis simulation final exercise: 25% (graded on a group basis)

***Crisis Analysis Memos:***

**Undergraduate** students may select any 2 of the 4 crises discussed in class as the subject of their crisis analysis presidential memoranda. **Graduate students** must complete all four memos. Each memo should briefly outline pertinent facts/background, identify feasible policy alternatives and articulate a clear position on these alternatives from the perspective of the role to be played that

week in class. Memos should NOT simply look back in time at what worked or did not work and analyze policies after the fact; rather, they should analyze the situation as a policymaker would at the time of the actual crisis and explain both the range of feasible policy options as well as the specific policy recommended. It is quite possible that you will recommend a course of action which appeared promising during the crisis at hand but which proved unsuccessful.

Each memo should be 4-6 pages (1 inch margins, no smaller than 12 point font, double spaced). Because the memos are designed in part to prepare students for class discussion, all memos are due at the **beginning** of class. No extensions will be granted.

### ***Class Participation:***

This course is designed to be an interactive seminar with simulated decision-making meetings and analysis. Class participation is essential and is heavily weighted in the final course grade. All students are expected to come to class having completed the reading and formulated opinions about different theoretical perspectives or policy options. In any week, several students will share the same crisis decision-making role—and you are encouraged to prepare as a team for class. However, all crisis analysis memos should be written individually.

As in any real group meeting, quality class participation is not determined by the amount of “air time” each speaker claims. Rather, a premium will be placed on contributing meaningful points and questions, on listening and building on the arguments of others, and on eliciting the participation of fellow class members.

Because this is a foreign policy course that relates theory to practice, students are required to keep abreast of foreign policy news throughout the quarter. **There will be a 5-minute weekly foreign policy quiz that counts toward your class participation grade.** Daily reading of the *New York Times* – which is available free at [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com) – is strongly recommended.

### ***Crisis Simulation (Group) Final Exam:***

The final exam will be a 4-day simulation of a foreign policy crisis. Before the simulation, students will be divided into teams based on roles to be played (e.g., Secretary of Defense Team, Secretary of State team). Teams will be responsible for researching their roles – including personal relationships between the real policymakers – before the crisis begins. The simulation consists of three parts. First, all of the teams will be asked to respond to breaking developments via email throughout the crisis period. These emails will come from various government agencies, from the press, and from foreign diplomatic sources. Bear in mind that other foreign policy problems and issues do not disappear during a crisis. You will be asked to deal with the full array of critical foreign policy issues facing the United States during the four-day period. In many cases, your response will require coordinating with other teams.

The second (and most significant) part of the simulation is a 2-hour mock National Security Council meeting that will be held during our regular class time. Each team should come to class prepared with a 5-7 minute oral policy briefing outlining key facts, policy alternatives, and recommendations for the president. Oral presentations must be accompanied by a written briefing pack of handouts or overheads. Teams also should be prepared to answer questions, engage in debate, and respond to any sudden crisis developments during the decision meeting.

Third, each team should submit a short (2-4) page memo summarizing the situation, assessing U.S. interests (with particular focus on your field), outlining policy options, and recommending a course of action.

Note: in this exercise, grading will be calculated on a group basis.

#### Readings:

There are 6 required books and a course reader. All can be purchased at LuValle's Store.

1. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision* (Little, Brown, 1999)
2. G. John Ikenberry, ed., *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*. 5th ed. (2005)
3. Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (Simon & Schuster, 1991)
4. Amy Zegart, *Flawed by Design* (Stanford University Press, 1999)
5. Scott Sagan & Kenneth Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (Norton, 2003)
6. The 9/11 Commission Report, authorized edition (Norton, July 2004) (NOTE: Also available for free online at <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm>)

#### Course Schedule and Reading Assignments

\*in course reader

### **PART I: THEORY, PROCESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY**

NOTE: OUR FIRST MEETING IS ON MONDAY, APRIL 3, NOT THURS APRIL 6

#### **Mon. April 3: Introduction: Crisis Decision Making after the Cold War and 9/11**

Samuel Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," in Ikenberry, pp. 539-550

Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," in Ikenberry pp.550-564

*The 9/11 Commission Report*, Chapters 1, 2, 10, (pp.1-70, 325-338)

#### **April 13: Levels of Analysis and Systemic Theory**

G. John Ikenberry, "Introduction," in Ikenberry (pp.1-11)

Kenneth Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," in Ikenberry (pp.60-83)

\*Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate" *A Foreign Affairs Reader* (N.Y. Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), pp. 22-49; response by Fouad Ajami "The Summoning" (pp.2-9) and Jeane Kirkpatrick, "The Modernizing Imperative: Tradition and Change" (pp.22-24).

\*Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp.5-41.

\*Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs*, Sept/Oct. 1998.

**April 20: Organizations, Regimes, and U.S. Foreign Policy**

Michael Mastanduno, "The United States Political System and International Leadership: A 'Decidedly Inferior' Form of Government?" in Ikenberry, pp. 248-268.

\*Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1983), pp.205-35.

Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, pp. 3-87.

Amy Zegart, *Flawed by Design*, "Introduction" (pp.1-11), Chapter 1, "Toward a Theory of National Security Agencies," (pp.12-53), Chapter 2, "Origins of the National Security Council System," pp.54-75; Chapter 3, "Evolution of the NSC System," pp.76-108.

**April 27: Decisionmaking Theories (Individual and Group Level)**

Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," In Ikenberry (pp.462-483)

\*Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, C.O.: Westview Press, 1980), Chapter 8, "Presidential Management Styles and Models" (pp.145-168), Chapter 9, "The Devil's Advocate: Uses and Limitations" (pp.169-174)

\*Irving L. Janis, "Escalation of the Vietnam War: How Could It Happen?"

\*Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 1966), Preface (pp.v-viii), Chapter 1, "The Diplomacy of Violence" (pp.1-34) and Chapter 2, "The Art of Commitment" (pp.35-91).

**May 4: Inside the Minds and Roles of Policymakers**

**24-HOUR TAKE-HOME MIDTERM EXAM DUE BY 5PM FRI. MAY 5**

\*Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1957), Chapter 1, "Officership as a Profession," (pp. 7-18) and Chapter 3, "The Military Mind," (pp.59-79)

\*Leslie H. Gelb, "Why Not the State Department?" *Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1980), pp. 25-40.

\*Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (New York: Free Press, 1991), Chapter 3, "The Power to Persuade," pp. 29-49

\* David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (Yale Univ. Press, 1974), pp. 13-77

\*Lee Hamilton, "What I Wish Political Scientists Would Teach about Congress," *PS: Political Science*, December 2000, pp.757-64.

## **PART II: FOUR CRISES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY**

### **May 11: The Cuban Missile Crisis**

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (Addison-Wesley, 1999), Introduction (entire); Chapter 1 (pp.13-33, 48-54), Chapter 2 (entire); Chapter 3 (pp.143-153, 163-185), Chapter 4 (entire); Chapter 5 (pp.255-61, 294-313); Chapter 6 (entire); Chapter 7 (pp.379-389)

\*Transcripts of October 16<sup>th</sup> ExComm meeting from Ernest May and Philip Zelikow, *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*. (Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 45-117.

### **May 18: The U.S. Hostage Crisis in Iran**

\*Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1985), Chapter 10, "The Fall of the Shah," (pp. 354-400) and Chapter 13, "Lives and National Interest" (pp. 470-512)

\*Warren Christopher, "Introduction," in Paul H. Kreisberg, ed., *American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 1-34.

\*Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (Fayetteville, Arkansas: 1995), pp. 457-58, 521-24.

\*Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran* (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 296-302.

### **May 25: The Persian Gulf War**

Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (entire)

\*Kenneth Pollack, "Next Stop Baghdad?" *Foreign Affairs* Mar/April 2002, pp. 32-47

\*Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray, "Saddam's Delusions: The View from Inside," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2006

**June 1: Somalia**

\*Nora Bensahel, "UNITAF and UNOSOM II: Restoring Hope in Somalia," Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University Department of Political Science, 1999, pp.94-156.

\*Harry Johnston and Ted Dagne, "Congress and the Somalia Crisis," in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, eds., *Learning from Somalia* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), pp.191-204.

\*Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 139-143; 316-324; 325-330; 335-337.

\*John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace Press, 1995), Forward and Preface (pp. vii-xxii), Chapter 1, "Origins of a Crisis" (pp.3-16).

\*Selected articles from the *New York Times* and *Washington Post*

**June 5-8: CRISIS SIMULATION FINAL EXAM (NSC meeting June 8)**